Trump Calls Out Japan: Military Escort Dilemma Emerges

The Surging News Reporter Chen Qinhang

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s long-planned visit to the U.S. is set to begin on March 19. Meanwhile, U.S. President Trump has thrown a difficult challenge, calling on five countries, including Japan, to send warships to “escort” ships through the Strait of Hormuz.

On the 16th, Takaichi told the Senate that “regarding what measures Japan can take within its legal framework, I am continuously considering and giving instructions.” The day before, her secretary spent two hours at the Prime Minister’s residence explaining the Middle East situation, but she still had no clear answer, caught in a dilemma.

According to Xinhua News Agency, Trump stated on the evening of the 15th that the U.S. is discussing with other countries to jointly ensure the safety of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, with about seven countries involved. The response has been “positive so far.” He said, “What to watch is which country will refuse to participate in this small effort to keep the shipping lanes open.”

As U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific, Japan and South Korea are among those named by Trump, but neither has given a definitive response. Since the outbreak of the U.S.-Iran conflict, the G7 countries have had differing stances. Takaichi has avoided commenting on U.S. military actions, only criticizing Iran for attacking civilian facilities in Gulf countries. She said she would “frankly discuss” the Iran situation during her meeting with Trump on the 19th.

On March 11, 2026, in Jebel Ali, UAE, a man walks along the coast as oil tankers and cargo ships queue in the Strait of Hormuz. Visual China

A poll published by Asahi Shimbun on the 15th showed that 82% of Japanese respondents do not support U.S. attacks on Iran, with only 9% supporting. Regarding Takaichi’s stance on this issue, 51% of Japanese respondents disapprove, far exceeding the 34% who approve.

Japan has long called on the international community to uphold the rule of law, but on the other hand, it finds it difficult to criticize its ally, the U.S., creating a dilemma. For Takaichi, whether to dispatch the Self-Defense Forces involves balancing the Japan-U.S. alliance, domestic legal grounds, the legitimacy of U.S. military actions, long-term friendly relations with Iran, and Japan’s heavy reliance on Middle Eastern oil.

Seven years ago, then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe faced a similar dilemma. Takaichi, who considers herself a successor to Abe’s policies, is about to confront Trump and will have to respond directly. Former Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba said on the 15th that during the talks, Takaichi should confirm whether U.S. actions comply with international law. “That’s an exercise of the right of self-defense; otherwise, what’s the point of the talks? Even allies, as independent sovereign states, should make such confirmations.”

Legal Inconsistencies

Since the U.S. and Israel launched military strikes against Iran on February 28, the Strait of Hormuz has effectively been blockaded. The energy crisis is approaching Japan, which officially began releasing its oil reserves on March 16, totaling about 80 million barrels—enough for 45 days of consumption—setting a record since Japan established its oil reserve system in 1978.

During Abe’s administration, Japan discussed expanding the Self-Defense Forces’ activities by citing the potential blockade of the Strait of Hormuz as an example in security-related legal debates. Now, these discussions are becoming reality.

According to Nihon Keizai Shimbun, if Japan considers deploying SDF units around the Strait of Hormuz, options include exercising collective self-defense to escort ships or providing support for U.S. military operations.

First, whether Japan can exercise collective self-defense based on the 2015 Cabinet decision was previously discussed by Abe in the House of Representatives, citing the Strait of Hormuz blockade as an example. He stated that the standard for SDF deployment is whether the situation “causes significant damage comparable to an armed attack on Japan.” He pointed out that the blockade could be recognized as a “situational crisis,” as Japan might face a severe energy crisis. In such cases, removing sea mines could be an act of exercising collective self-defense.

On March 9, Democratic Party for the People Senator Kiyomi Tsujimoto submitted a question about the relationship between the Strait of Hormuz situation and the concept of a “situational crisis,” but the government has not responded. During a press conference on March 11, when asked whether laying mines in the Strait of Hormuz constitutes a “situational crisis,” Chief Cabinet Secretary Nariaki Kihara denied it.

If the threat of mines in the strait does not reach the level requiring the exercise of collective self-defense, another scenario exists: if international peace and security are threatened, the SDF can act jointly under the UN Charter’s principles, provided there is a UN resolution. Supporting a country that initiates “preemptive attacks” also raises legal issues, as international law prohibits a country from using force against another without being attacked first. In fact, the U.S. military’s actions this time did not go through the UN and are not in response to Iran’s armed attack.

However, Japan deploying ships to the Strait of Hormuz is not impossible. In 2019, amid escalating U.S.-Iran tensions and attacks on oil tankers in the Strait, the U.S. promoted the creation of a “escort coalition” to protect commercial ships passing through. Japan was asked to cooperate. Prime Minister Abe, considering U.S. positions and relations with Iran, did not join the escort coalition but proposed a compromise—sending patrol ships based on the SDF Law to nearby waters for intelligence gathering and preparing for escort missions.

Japanese media reports suggest Takaichi is likely to consider similar frameworks. However, if she acts under the SDF Law for maritime security operations, she can only escort Japanese-flagged ships. To resolve these legal disputes, Japan would need to establish appropriate legal frameworks, which requires time for drafting legislation and parliamentary review.

Takaichi faces many options, but legal hurdles and opposition from both political sides make progress difficult. On the 15th, Liberal Democratic Party Policy Research Council Chairman Koichi Kato expressed caution about dispatching SDF units to the Strait of Hormuz on NHK. He said, “Legally, it’s not impossible, but in ongoing conflicts, caution is necessary. The threshold is very high.” Komeito Policy Research Council Chairman Misono Okamoto warned, “Absolutely do not promise what cannot be done.”

“At this stage, dispatching the SDF is not under consideration,” Defense Minister Kishi Nobuo said on the 16th. He added that if there are exceptional needs related to the safety of ships or personnel, the Maritime Security Operations could be ordered. However, Takaichi stated on the same day that issuing such orders “is legally difficult.”

Diplomatic Dilemmas

Even if Japan bypasses legal obstacles and cooperates with the U.S. to send warships to the Strait of Hormuz, it would further narrow Japan’s diplomatic options.

Japan established diplomatic relations with Iran in 1929, and for a long time, the two countries maintained generally friendly and stable relations. Japanese companies participated in Iran’s energy development projects but withdrew under U.S. sanctions. Japan also attempted to mediate between the U.S. and Iran; in 2019, amid heightened tensions, Prime Minister Abe visited Tehran and met with Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei—Japan’s first prime minister visit since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Although the mediation had limited effect, Japan’s government stated the visit aimed to develop traditional friendly relations, ease regional tensions, and facilitate U.S.-Iran dialogue.

Since the outbreak of the U.S.-Israel-Iran conflict, Japan’s attitude toward Iran has clearly shifted. Foreign Minister Mogi Toshimitsu, on March 9, expressed concern over the worsening Middle East situation during a call with Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi. He condemned Iran’s attacks on Gulf civilian facilities and threats to navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, demanding a halt to such actions, but did not mention U.S. or Israeli strikes. Japanese media pointed out that exercising collective self-defense in the Strait would mean viewing Iran as an enemy, marking a major shift in Japan’s diplomatic strategy.

Beyond bilateral relations, Japan’s diplomatic stance is further tested. Japan emphasizes a rules-based international order and opposes unilateral use of force to change the status quo. However, this principle conflicts with the U.S. actions—strikes against Iran without consulting allies. If Japan agrees to U.S. requests, it risks being caught deeper between alliance obligations and its declared values.

Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force is considered highly capable of mine clearance, having accumulated experience after World War II in removing some 60,000 mines laid by U.S. and Japanese forces around Japanese waters. During the Korean War and after the Gulf War, Japan also participated in mine clearance operations.

According to U.S. media outlet The National Interest, most of the “Vanguard” class mine countermeasures ships stationed at the U.S. Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain were decommissioned by 2025. These wooden and fiberglass vessels, first deployed during the Gulf War in 1991, are part of the U.S. Navy’s efforts. The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) during Trump’s first term noted that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps has made mine warfare a core part of its strategy, using low-cost, low-tech mines as a force multiplier in asymmetric warfare. Currently, the U.S. Navy can use near-shore combat ships as minesweepers but also relies on allies’ cooperation.

“With missiles and drones flying, minesweeping is impossible. It can only be done after a ceasefire, or the ships will be destroyed,” said Yutaka Yamashita, a former Japan Ground Self-Defense Force officer, to Japanese media. Even post-conflict mine clearance is challenging; in 1991, SDF personnel involved in Gulf War mine clearance faced enormous psychological pressure.

Given the current Japan-U.S. summit situation, Japanese officials told NHK that Japan might be directly asked to act, including dispatching SDF units to the Middle East, so preparations are necessary. Shigeru Ishiba, on the 15th, said on Fuji TV that Trump’s call for warship dispatching “includes China, which is very different from previous cases. This should be fully discussed, and Japan should not keep delaying giving an answer.”

The Nihon Keizai Shimbun reported on the 15th that Takaichi’s visit to the U.S. is before Trump’s visit to China. Amid deteriorating Japan-China relations, she aims to clarify Japan’s stance, seek Trump’s understanding, and avoid U.S.-China negotiations bypassing Japan.

The Iran situation adds new complexities to already fragile U.S.-Japan relations. The two U.S. destroyers stationed in Yokosuka have been redeployed to the Arabian Sea. The Trump administration continues to pressure Japan to increase defense spending, and now it expects Japan to send warships for escort duties. Meanwhile, Japan’s economy is under strain, presenting unprecedented challenges for the Takaichi government.