The second half of real estate development: who is taking control away from property companies

By the third month of 2026, the progress bar has reached its halfway point, and the industry’s bulletin boards are filled with lamentable news.

Country Garden has slashed more than 30% of its stake in Color Life to settle with creditors; Evergrande Property quietly rests on the liquidation shelf, awaiting the final bid at a hundred-billion-yuan auction; Huang Qingping, founder of Risen Life Services, hands over the last controlling stake amid internal conflicts; Jinke Services, once crowned “Southwest Property’s First Stock,” delists from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange under the management of PE giant Boyu Capital…

Once regarded as a “cash cow” and “second growth curve,” listed property management companies are undergoing unprecedented power restructuring and asset resets.

Some are forced to sell assets to survive; some are pursued for old debts; some are quietly hunted by capital; some exit quietly amid internal struggles; others skillfully maneuver between kinship and contracts… In the second half of the real estate debt crisis, amidst similar predicaments, property companies’ owners display vastly different bottom lines and tactics to preserve their flames or interests.

At this crossroads of fate, it’s not just about re-pricing assets but also about the ultimate game of power. The stage is set, drums beating louder, curtains rising—everyone wants to know: when the tide recedes, who is swimming naked, who has reached the shore, and who will remain forever on the mudflat?

Power Strangulation

“There’s no clear line between ‘white knight’ and ‘capital hunter.’”

At exactly 4 p.m. on February 20, 2026, on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange’s electronic display, a stock code that had flickered for five years quietly went dark—Jinke Services, once valued over HKD 55 billion and hailed as “Southwest Property’s First Stock,” ended its listing with a residual value of HKD 5.2 billion.

The orchestrator of this farewell was PE giant Boyu Capital, the strategic investor that entered in December 2021 as a “white knight.” Meanwhile, Huang Hongyun, founder of Jinke Services, had long lost control amid the struggles of debt-to-asset conversion.

In Nanjing, 1,300 kilometers from Chongqing, Huang Qingping’s exit from his self-founded property company reads like a dark script filled with internal conflicts.

On February 6, 2026, Risen Life Services announced that Huang Qingping transferred his last 25.13% stake to “mysterious third party” Chen Xiao. After the transaction, his shareholding in Risen Life dropped to 5.20%, losing control of the company.

Prior to this, on November 3, 2025, citing “personal affairs,” Huang Qingping and his longtime partner Xie Chenguang, who had been with him for 27 years, both stepped down from Risen Life’s board—Huang resigned as non-executive director, Xie as executive director and chairman. At year’s end, through shareholder votes, Huang’s confidants Zhu Li, Wen Hao, and Ma Wenhong were also removed from the board.

Interestingly, the shareholding ratio in this deal appears carefully designed: Chen Xiao’s 25.13% stake is just below Ruihua Investment’s 27.98%. With this, Ruihua Investment regained control over the listed property company in terms of personnel and influence.

Huang Qingping’s downfall was foreshadowed by the internal conflict with former CEO Li Chunling over a year earlier. Meanwhile, Ruihua Investment, through prolonged internal investigations and governance restructuring, gradually secured more power—from company name changes to personnel arrangements and shareholding divisions.

Old Debt Recovery

On another front, Song Gewei and his listed property company face more direct old debt recovery.

On February 12, 2026, Kangqiao Yue Life received a heavy second-instance judgment: its wholly owned subsidiary must pay HKD 474 million in principal and interest.

This “mine” was planted back in 2021. At that time, Song Gewei’s Henan Chengqiao Real Estate applied for a bank loan, and Kangqiao Yue Life’s subsidiary signed a commitment letter to make up the shortfall.

Strangely, this commitment letter was not recorded in the company’s internal files until July 2024, when an audit revealed HKD 200 million had been improperly withdrawn and returned by the bank, exposing this hidden story.

The first-instance judgment had offered hope, assigning 40% joint liability and estimating a maximum cost of HKD 180 million, suggesting it wouldn’t affect the company’s ongoing operations. But the second-instance ruling reversed this, requiring full repayment. With a net profit of about HKD 68.8 million in 2024, Kangqiao Yue Life would need seven years to settle this debt.

Being dragged into the vortex for backing the actual controller’s debts, the story of Bao Bao Zhi’s involvement with Color Life takes a more proactive turn.

On January 2, 2026, Fantasia Holdings agreed with a buyer on a restructuring deal, selling nearly half of its Color Life shares—409 million shares, about 21.97% of the total. After the deal, Fantasia retained only 9.98%, and Color Life was no longer a subsidiary.

This restructuring stemmed from a 2021 financial transaction between Fantasia and TFISF. When Fantasia failed to repay a maturing senior note, TFISF sought to recover its “alleged debt” (principal and interest totaling about USD 120 million) and “alleged collateral” (Color Life shares pledged and with liens). The dispute lasted four years, with TFISF once attempting to auction the shares.

But the buyer was not an outsider—through a “penetrating” look at the ownership structure, it was controlled indirectly by Fantasia’s major shareholder Zeng Baozhu, holding about 67.36%. This “internal transfer” approach is common in debt restructuring for property firms, effectively preserving the core assets amid debt pressures.

Extreme Maneuvering

The masterful “extreme maneuvers” also include Hu Yiping and the Xu Jiankang family.

On February 23, 2026, Daxin Service Group’s capital increase announcement revealed a fundamental reversal in its core operating subsidiary, Daxin Shengquan Property. The employee shareholding platform Deqing Kaisi Bo, led by two executive directors Tang Junjie and Zheng Peng, increased its stake to 34.9% after two rounds of capital injection.

What’s more intriguing is the payment method. Both the initial HKD 10.3 million and the subsequent nearly HKD 97 million were paid in installments. Some payments could be deferred until late 2027, “not causing immediate cash pressure on Deqing Kaisi Bo.”

This “buy now, pay later” approach is rare in major equity transactions of listed companies. External observers see this as Hu Yiping, the actual controller, secretly maintaining a “green thread” under the ruins: isolating core assets through management-held shares, so that even if the listed entity faces misfortune, its most valuable operational assets remain relatively independent.

At Powerlong Commercial, the Xu family’s story is one of kinship-based protection.

On January 27, 2026, Powerlong Realty sold 25% of Powerlong Commercial for HKD 361 million to family members—controlled jointly by Xu Zhanhao and his cousin Xu Hualin.

The timing is notable—Powerlong was in a critical phase of domestic and overseas debt restructuring. Its offshore restructuring plan listed Powerlong Commercial’s equity as a key resource for debt repayment, allowing creditors to offset debts with up to 32.4% of shares, risking loss of control.

Through this internal family transfer, the company gained cash flow while maintaining influence—despite potential further share reductions due to restructuring.

Kinship is building the last line of defense.

On March 1, professional manager Xu Meng resigned, citing “more time for other businesses.” He was replaced by 39-year-old Cai Erchao, a relative of the founder Xu Jiankang’s family and cousin of Xu Hualin, the current head of Powerlong.

No One at the Helm

As long as there’s defense and struggle, there’s hope. Better than the tragic scenes of no leadership.

Evergrande Property’s latest update states: the liquidator has received several updated bid proposals from selected bidders and is considering them; no opinions or formal agreements have been reached yet.

This former industry giant now quietly waits on the liquidation shelf, awaiting the highest bid. Its founder and actual controller, Xu Jiayin, is no longer in his chess game.

Another listed property company, Lihigh Healthy Living, faces an uncertain fate.

On January 2, 2026, an internal memo announced that due to a default by its controlling shareholder, Lihigh Real Estate Group, 75% of Lihigh Healthy Living’s shares had been officially appointed to a receiver.

In other words, Lihigh Healthy Living has reached a critical juncture and may face change of control. The story of Jiayuan Services, which was taken over in September 2024, is instructive: the receiver sold 73.56% of its shares for HKD 99 million to Huasheng Capital Securities, the lender that had provided mortgage financing.

Industry analysts, drawing lessons from the past, warn that once the receiver begins selling, the combined control of brothers Huang Ruohong and Huang Ruoqing over 52.43% of Lihigh Real Estate will be completely lost.

In fact, Lihigh Healthy Living pledged 150 million shares (about 75% of total shares) to a genuine commercial loan shortly after listing in 2022.

Currently, there are no signs that the receiver is actively seeking potential buyers for the pledged shares, and there is little information on how they will handle forced sales.

Despite emphasizing “business operations and management remain normal,” industry observers say this fundamental control suspension casts a heavy shadow over the company’s strategic continuity, management stability, and long-term development.

For the remaining controllers on the table, the road ahead remains shrouded in fog. The only certainty in this game is that those who can balance the interests of controllers, corporate governance, and public expectations may survive the cycle and last until the end.

The second half of the real estate debt crisis—the game over “control”—is far from over.