The Arctic Geopolitical Game in the Early Cold War: How the United States Used Retreat to Occupy Greenland

After the end of World War II, the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union cast a shadow over the globe. At that time, Washington’s emphasis on Arctic strategic value far exceeded what the world imagined. The US government even conceived an ambitious idea—to directly purchase Greenland from Denmark. In late 1946, the US State Department convened a secret meeting with Danish diplomatic officials in New York, with then-Secretary of State Dean Acheson personally presenting an astonishing proposal: the US was willing to pay with the Alaska Barrow region plus 100 million dollars in exchange for Denmark relinquishing sovereignty over Greenland.

Acheson’s words at the time sounded casual, but hidden beneath was deep meaning. He indicated in a tone that left no room for rejection that Greenland was a heavy economic burden for Denmark, and that the US urgently needed this territory to form an effective defensive fortress against the Soviet Union. If this deal could be struck, what he called a “clean and straightforward” solution would be the best win-win outcome.

Strategic Considerations Under the Shadow of the Soviet Union

Denmark’s refusal was not simply due to national pride. What truly put the Danish government in a dilemma was the invisible pressure from the Soviet side. At that time, the USSR was experiencing a period of rising power, with control extending into Eastern Europe, and the Baltic states had already fallen under its sphere of influence. Danish authorities knew well that selling Greenland to the US would mean the Arctic region falling completely under American strategic control, which was tantamount to provoking the Soviet Union. More worrying was that angering Moscow could lead to unpredictable retaliation—since the Baltic Sea was already part of Soviet territory, exposing Denmark to its threat, a rash decision could result in disaster.

America’s Second Best and a Perfect Ending

The negotiations broke down, but the Americans were well-versed in negotiation tactics. Since the purchase plan was no longer feasible, Washington shifted to a pressure strategy, forcing Denmark to sign the “US-Denmark Greenland Defense Agreement.” This agreement appeared to be merely a defense arrangement, but in reality, it granted the US the most crucial strategic benefit—US military forces officially stationed in northwest Greenland, establishing what would later be known as Thule Air Base (now called Pituffik Space Base).

This outcome was a perfect victory for the US. It avoided paying the 100 million dollars, avoided the burden of managing the island’s livelihood and economy, yet gained absolute military control over a key area of the Arctic—an even more valuable geopolitical victory than monetary transactions. Although the Soviet Union became the target of strategic containment, it could not exert effective constraints over Greenland affairs. This laid the foundation for America’s strategic deployment in the Arctic.