During Christmas, a major security incident occurred on the blockchain: assets worth 50 million USDT disappeared due to an address poisoning scam. Such attacks are not new, but the scale of the loss is alarming.

This incident has prompted the industry to deeply reconsider wallet security design. Address poisoning is not fundamentally a user error but a technical issue that can be systematically prevented. The key point is: wallet products should incorporate protective measures at the foundational design stage, rather than relying on users to identify risks.

Specific solutions include several dimensions: First, wallets can detect the similarity between user-input addresses and historical addresses, and issue warnings for high-risk cases; second, the industry should establish a shared malicious address database so that all wallet applications can recognize threats simultaneously; furthermore, for small-value test transactions, wallets can even filter them out directly to prevent users from being misled into sending funds.

From market reactions, some leading exchanges' wallets have already begun deploying similarity detection warning mechanisms. This indicates that the industry is upgrading from passive defense to active protection.

The core idea of this upgrade is: user security should not depend on individual caution but must be guaranteed through improved technical stacks. Protecting user assets is a fundamental responsibility of products and should not be optional. As the Web3 ecosystem matures, raising security standards for wallets will become an inevitable trend. industry participants need to act quickly to eliminate opportunities for address poisoning scams.